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Stumbling at the Finish Line: Employment
Discrimination and the Utah Supreme Court in
Burton v. Exam Center Industrial
I. INTRODUCTION
“Bias Allowed at Small Utah Firms”1 announced the arrival of
the Utah Supreme Court’s closely contested (three-two) decision in
Burton v. Exam Center Industrial.2 While the court correctly chose
between an individual’s right to be employed regardless of age and
the Utah legislature’s express intent to limit that right, the majority’s
failure to clearly analyze Burton’s claim made its opinion appear
poorly reasoned and its decision more difficult than necessary. Normally, such a failure would be harmless. However, as the issues that
faced the court in Burton continue to surface in the future, the need
for clear and complete reasoning will become increasingly apparent.
This Note begins in Part II with a discussion of the relevant portions of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act (UADA) and overviews the
tort of discharge in violation of a public policy. Part III then briefly
explains the factual and procedural background of the Burton decision. Part IV analyzes the reasoning of the majority and dissenting
opinions, focusing on two specific issues. First, it compares the
strengths of the policy-related arguments made by the majority and
dissent in Burton, concluding that the majority offered the stronger
arguments. Second, it examines Burton’s claim in relation to established Utah law governing the tort of discharge in violation of a public policy—a step the Burton majority never took. This analysis shows
that the Utah Supreme Court rightfully rejected Burton’s claim but
failed to carefully compare Burton’s claims with the tort’s requirements. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
This Note contends that, while the court reached the correct decision in Burton, a lack of thorough analysis of one key area of law
makes the opinion appear more difficult than it truly was. Like view1. Ray Rivera, Bias Allowed at Small Utah Firms, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 20, 2000, at
A1. The view taken by the Deseret News was somewhat softer. See, Age Bias Ruled Not Illegal
in Small Firms, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 20, 2000, at B6.
2. No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000).
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ing a runner, who after dominating a race, stumbles at the finish line
and barely finishes ahead of the nearest competitor, one walks away
from the Burton majority opinion with the impression that the race
was much closer than it really was.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the issues that faced the Utah Supreme Court in
Burton, some understanding of the UADA and the tort of discharge
in violation of a public policy is essential. This section recounts the
relevant provisions of the UADA and explains the history and elements of the tort at common law.
A. The UADA 3
When an employee wishes to bring a claim of employment discrimination based on age, the UADA provides the employee’s exclusive state law remedy.4 Thus, the employee cannot also raise the tort
claim of discharge in violation of a public policy. The UADA governs
both the process and remedies available to the employee. This section reviews the legislative history of federal legislation upon which
the UADA is based, some of the statute’s essential provisions, and
the extensive administrative process that an employee must follow to
bring an employment discrimination claim under the statute.
1. Legislative history by inference
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the UADA was not recorded. However, as the UADA is based on both Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), many of the Utah legislature’s concerns can
be inferred from the legislative history of those federal acts.
The underlying legislative goal of Title VII and subsequent legislation (including state equivalents, such as the UADA) was to eliminate discrimination from U.S. society. However, these legislative acts
have limited application. Title VII, for example, exempts employers
with fewer than fifteen employees from compliance.5 Similarly, the
3. At the time Burton commenced, the UADA was codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §
34-35-1 (1994). The UADA is presently located at UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-1 (1998).
However, the issues in question were unaffected by this change.
4. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-107(15) (1998).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
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ADEA exempts employers that have less than twenty employees.6
These limitations show that Congress considered other factors besides its desire to combat discrimination in implementing Title VII
and related legislation.7
More specifically, while eliminating discrimination drove Congress’s implementation of Title VII’s general framework (which includes the ADEA), at least two additional concerns influenced Congress’s decision to limit the legislation’s applicability. First, Congress
did not want to intrude on the highly personal and intimate relationships associated with small employers, recognizing that many small
employers are family-operated businesses.8 Acknowledging that personal and intimate relationships frequently form part of such businesses, Congress concluded that the government should refrain from
unduly intruding into the small-business environment.9
Second, Congress desired to protect businesses with limited resources from the costs and burdens resulting from compliance with
the federal statute and any resulting litigation.10 As the Seventh Circuit recognized, this concern also applied to the ADEA’s twenty employee exemption, which was instituted “to spare very small firms
from the potentially crushing expense of mastering the intricacies of
the antidiscrimination laws, establishing procedures to assure compliance, and defending against suits when efforts at compliance fail.”11
Thus, the competing public policy concerns contemplated by
Congress in implementing Title VII and the ADEA indicate the delicate balance Congress attempted to achieve: eliminating discrimination while avoiding unnecessarily intruding into intimate, personal
relationships or burdening small employers with the costs of compli-

6. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
7. Amicus for Utah Manufacturers advanced a similar argument. See Brief for Amicus
Utah Manufacturers at 19, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469
(Utah Jan. 19, 2000). In addition to noting the cost of compliance, amicus also argued that
the legislative history indicates a concern that government control over small businesses would
cause the government to become involved in relationships of small businesses that are often
intimate or familial in nature. See id. at 18.
8. See generally 110 CONG. REC. 13,085-88 (June 9, 1964).
9. See generally id.
10. See Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Birkbeck
v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that limiting application
of the ADEA to businesses with more than 20 employers was to reduce the burden of the
ADEA on small employers).
11. Papa, 166 F.3d at 940 (citations omitted); see also Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510.
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ance. The result was limited coverage of Title VII and the ADEA to
employers with a certain number of employees, “[striking] a balance
between the goal of stamping out all discrimination and the goal of
protecting small entities from the hardship of litigating discrimination claims.”12 The Utah Legislature’s decision to limit the UADA to
employers with at least fifteen employees likely involved concerns
similar to those of Congress.
2. The UADA’s policy provisions
The UADA clearly forbids discrimination on the basis of age.
The statute establishes that it is a discriminatory, or prohibited, employment practice “[f]or an employer to refuse to hire, or promote,
or discharge. . . any person otherwise qualified, because of race,
color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions,
age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, religion, national
origin, or handicap.”13
As previously noted, however, the UADA does not apply to all
employers. An “employer” is statutorily defined as “the state; any
political subdivision; board, commission, department, institution,
school district; . . . or a person employing 15 or more employees within
the state for each working day in each of 20 calendar weeks or more
in the current or preceding calendar year.”14 Thus, any private employer with fewer than fifteen employees is not subject to the provisions of the UADA. The Act also eliminates religious organizations
or associations and their subsidiaries and agents from its definition of
an employer.15
3. UADA procedures
As “the exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, . . . age, religion, national origin, or
disability,”16 the UADA details the procedures through which an aggrieved individual must file a claim with the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division (UADD). The individual, on his own or
12. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995); see
also Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510.
13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-106(1)(a)(i) (1998).
14. § 34A-5-102 (8)(a) (emphasis added).
15. § 34A-5-102(8)(b).
16. § 34A-5-107(15).
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through counsel, must sign and file a request for agency action.17
This request is made under oath and must “be filed within 180 days
after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
occurred.”18
Before the UADD schedules a hearing on the matter, it assigns
an investigator to help the parties negotiate a settlement.19 If the parties fail to reach a settlement, however, the investigator is required to
formally submit findings of fact to the agency director.20 In the event
that there is insufficient evidence to support the employee’s allegations of discrimination, the director may issue a determination and
order the dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.21 Should either
party desire to appeal the director’s decision, the appeal must be
made in writing within thirty days of the decision, or the order issued by the director becomes the final order of the commission.22 A
similar process occurs if the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence
to support the allegations of discrimination.23
Subsequent hearings are available if the parties properly appeal,
and all decisions are subject to judicial review.24 “Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process . . .” 25 in order to avoid the expense of litigation.
This emphasis on conciliation is much greater than that found in
typical civil litigation.
B. Tortious Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
Having no recourse under the UADA because his employer had
fewer than fifteen employees, the Burton plaintiff brought a common
law claim of tortious discharge in violation of a public policy.26 This
section reviews the history of this particular tort in Utah and identifies its prima facie elements.

17. See § 34A-5-107(1).
18. § 34A-5-107(1)(c).
19. See § 34A-5-107(3)(a).
20. See § 34A-5-107(4).
21. See § 34A-5-107(4)(b).
22. See §§ 34A-5-107(4)(c)-(d).
23. See §§ 34A-5-107(8), (9), (12).
24. See § 34A-5-107(12).
25. § 34A-5-107(10).
26. Brief for Appellant at 4, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL
38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000).
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1. The history of tortious discharge in violation of public policy in Utah
Utah case law first recognized the tort of discharge in violation
of a public policy in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.27 In Berube, the
Utah Supreme Court held that “[w]here an employee is discharged
for a reason or in a manner that contravenes sound principles of established and substantial public policy, the employee may typically
bring a tort cause of action against his employer.”28 While affirming
that statements by the legislature can constitute a public policy, the
court refused to limit public policy solely to enactments by the state
legislature.29 The court concluded that “[l]imiting the scope of public policy to legislative enactments would necessarily eliminate aspects
of the public interest which deserve protection. . . . Judicial decisions
can also enunciate substantial principles of public policy in areas
which the legislature has not treated.”30 The court also asserted that
“[n]ot every legislative enactment . . . embodies public policy; only
those which protect the public or promote public interest qualify.”31
The Berube court specifically warned against the overuse of the
principles of public policy in justifying a claim for discharge in violation of a public policy: “We also stress that actions for wrongful termination based on this exception must involve substantial and important public policies.”32 Furthermore, the court committed to
“construe public policies narrowly and . . . generally utilize those
based on prior legislative pronouncements or judicial decisions, applying only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental
that there can be virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the public good.”33
Since Berube, Utah courts have continued to fine-tune the scope
of public policy on a case-by-case basis.34 Rather than explicitly define what constitutes a public policy, the Utah Supreme Court explained in Peterson v. Browning that “declarations of public policy
can be found in our statutes and constitutions.”35 Such declarations
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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must be expressed in constitutional or statutory language that clearly
expresses the public conscience and only occurs “when the affected
interests of society are substantial.”36
The Peterson court further indicated that actions falling within
the public policy exception to at-will employment “typically involve
termination of employment for (1) refusing to commit an illegal or
wrongful act, (2) performing a public obligation, or (3) exercising a
legal right or privilege.”37 The court also declared that an action for
discharge in violation of a public policy sounded in tort, allowing the
employee to recover not only economic losses such as back pay but
also consequential damages (e.g., pain and suffering) and possibly
punitive damages.38
2. The elements of discharge in violation of a public policy
To establish a prima facie case of wrongful discharge in violation
of a public policy, an employee must satisfy the four-prong test set
forth in Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc.39 The employee must show
“(i) that [the] employer terminated [the employee]; (ii) that a clear
and substantial public policy existed; (iii) that the employee’s conduct brought the policy into play; and (iv) that the discharge and the
conduct bringing the policy into play are causally connected.”40
If the employee successfully establishes a prima facie case, the
employer must then “articulate a legitimate reason for the discharge.”41 Should the employer provide sufficient evidence that a legitimate reason prompted the employee’s termination, “the employee must prove that engaging in the protected conduct was a

36. Id.
37. Id. at 1281 (citing Jill S. Goldsmith, Note, Employment-at-Will-Employers May Not
Discharge At-Will Employees for Reasons that Violate Public Policy-Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Memorial Hospital, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 161, 166-67). In notes 67 through 69, Goldsmith
describes examples of actions that would meet the four elements. For example, refusing to
commit an illegal act could cover discharge for an employee who refuses to commit perjury. See
id. at 166 n.67. Termination of an employee who served on a jury would be an example of
discharge for performing a public obligation. See id. at 167 n.68. Terminating an employee
who decided to receive worker’s compensation would be an example of terminating an employee who was exercising a legal right or privilege. See id. at n.69.
38. See id. at 1285.
39. 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998).
40. Id. at 404.
41. Id. at 405. The court indicated that the employer bears the burden of producing
admissible evidence of another reason for terminating the employee. See id. at 405 n.5.
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‘substantial factor’ in the employer’s motivation to discharge the
employee.”42
III. BURTON V. EXAM CENTER INDUSTRIAL
A. The Facts
Exam Center Industrial (“Exam Center”) is an industrial medical
clinic whose operations include performing physical examinations for
workers referred to it by other employers.43 Burton worked as a physician and reported directly to Howard Boulter, who allegedly made
the decision to terminate Burton and other “older” doctors.44 In explaining why Burton was discharged, Boulter purportedly stated, “I
didn’t know how much longer you older guys wanted to work.”45
Exam Center denied that Boulter made any type of statement
regarding Burton’s age, contending that Burton was discharged because Exam Center no longer needed his services.46
Seeking a remedy under the UADA, Burton filed a discrimination complaint with the UADD. The UADD rejected his claim,
however, because Exam Center employed fewer than fifteen individuals.47
B. Procedural History
After the UADD rejected his claim, Burton brought suit against
Exam Center in state district court, seeking relief for tortious wrongful termination in violation of a public policy.48 Exam Center moved
for summary judgment, which the district court originally denied but
then granted on Exam Center’s motion for reconsideration.49 The
district court then entered an order dismissing Burton’s cause of ac-

42. Id. at 405.
43. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL
38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000).
44. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *1.
45. Id.
46. See Brief for Appellee at 5-6, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL
38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000).
47. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *1.
48. See id.
49. See id.
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tion for tortious wrongful termination.50 Burton subsequently obtained leave to bring an interlocutory appeal from the order to the
Utah Supreme Court.51 Exam Center then filed a Motion for Summary Disposition with the supreme court.52
The court heard oral arguments, but requested amicus briefs
prior to rendering a decision.53 After receiving the amicus briefs, the
court allowed each party to file a response brief.
C. The Utah Supreme Court’s Holding
On January 19, 2000, the Utah Supreme Court announced its
decision: by a narrow three-to-two margin, the court rejected Burton’s claim affirming the district court’s decision.54 Chief Justice
Howe, writing for the majority, indicated that Burton had failed to
identify a public policy (as defined under Utah law) against age discrimination in employment.55 Howe further argued that recognizing
Burton’s claim would cause undue hardship on small employers.56
In dissent, Associate Chief Justice Durham accused the majority
of failing to carefully analyze the public policy justifying Burton’s
claim.57 Durham also predicted that the majority’s decision would
“create an enormous loophole which Utah employers may exploit to
the detriment of many Utah employees.”58
IV. ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions in Burton, focusing on two specific issues. First, it com50. See Appellee’s Brief, at 6.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Three parties accepted the court’s invitation to submit an amicus brief. The ACLU
and AFL-CIO each submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Burton. See Brief for Amicus
ACLU, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000);
Brief for Amicus ALF-CIO, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469
(Utah Jan. 19, 2000). Utah Manufacturers Association (a collection of various business interests) filed on behalf of Exam Center. See Brief for Amicus Utah Manufacturers, Burton v.
Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000).
54. See Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469, at *6 (Utah Jan.
19, 2000).
55. See id. at *5.
56. See id. at *6.
57. See id. at *7.
58. Id.
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pares the relative strengths of the policy-related arguments made by
the majority and dissent, concluding that the majority offered the
stronger arguments. Second, it examines Burton’s claim under established Utah law governing the tort of discharge in violation of public
policy—a step the majority in Burton never took. This analysis shows
that the supreme court rightfully rejected Burton’s claim. However,
the majority’s focus on public policy rather than Burton’s failure to
satisfy the tort’s established requirements made the decision appear
to be a closer call than it truly was.
A. Who is Correct—The Majority or the Dissent?
1. The majority’s arguments
The majority’s determination to affirm the district court’s decision was correct on both legal and public policy grounds for two reasons. First, though Burton and amici ACLU and AFL-CIO raised
compelling public policy reasons why the court should allow Burton
to proceed with a tort claim based on discharge in violation of a public policy, Exam Center’s policy arguments to the contrary were
more persuasive. Second, the cases that Burton and Justice Durham’s
dissent relied upon are easily distinguished from Burton’s facts.
a. Separation of powers. The majority’s most powerful public policy argument involves the doctrine of separation of powers. With respect to this doctrine, the majority indicated that “[d]ue respect for
the legislative prerogative in lawmaking requires that the judiciary
not interfere with enactments of the Legislature where disagreement
is founded only on policy considerations and the legislative scheme
employs reasonable means to effectuate a legitimate object.”59
Two well-established principles of Utah law support the majority’s separation of powers argument. First, Utah courts have recognized that not only can the legislature create rights that do not exist
at common law or under the Constitution but it can also limit the
applicability of those rights to certain groups of individuals. Second,
the courts have also maintained that when the legislature creates
such a right, the judiciary’s role is limited to interpreting and applying the applicable law. These principles apply directly to protection
from age discrimination, which is a legislatively-created right.

59. Id. at *5.
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(1) Legislative ability to create limited rights. Utah courts
have previously recognized the right of the legislature to create rights
that are limited to certain groups of individuals. Two examples illustrate this principle. The first is a judicial interpretation of Utah’s
wrongful death statute, which created a right to bring a wrongful
death claim that did not exist at common law, while the second involves a decision sustaining a Utah statute limiting the right to recover general damages in a personal injury claim.
(a) Wrongful death statute. In State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co. v. Clyde,60 the Utah Supreme Court entertained a
claim brought under the wrongful death statute by grandparents of a
minor child.61 Under Utah law, parents and guardians have a statutorily created right to bring a cause of action against a party who
caused the death of a minor.62 In Clyde, the plaintiffs argued that,
because they had provided for the child’s maintenance and were her
sole means of support, they should be able to recover under the
wrongful death statute even though they were not the child’s biological parents.63 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that they
were de facto parents or guardians and affirmed the district court’s
decision to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.64
While expressing sympathy for the grandparents’ loss, the court
stated that “[t]he fact that the result in some circumstances may be
to unreasonably restrict the class of persons who can bring a wrongful
death action is an argument for amendment of the statute, not for
our ignoring its words.”65 The court held that, even though the result
may be unfortunate, the court was not entitled to “ignore the plain
language of section 78-11-6.”66
The Clyde court’s reasoning is equally applicable to the plaintiff’s
claim in Burton. While the result for Burton (assuming that he was
indeed discharged due to his age) may be unfortunate, the court
must not ignore the UADA’s plain statutory language to remedy a
perceived inequity. The court is thus limited to applying the statute

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

920 P.2d 1184 (Utah 1996).
See id. at 1185.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-6 (1998).
See Clyde, 920 P.2d at 1185.
See id. at 1186-87.
Id. at 1187 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id.
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as written, rather than attempting to correct it. The proper method
of statutory alteration is the legislative amendment process.
(b) Personal injury protection. Utah’s Personal Injury Protection (PIP) statute prevents an accident victim from collecting
general damages unless certain conditions are met, such as the incurring of medical expenses in excess of $3,000.67 In Warren v. Melville,68 the plaintiff’s medical expenses totaled $2,583.56; thus, based
on express statutory language, the plaintiff was not entitled to collect
general damages.69
In defense of its decision to deny the plaintiff’s claim, the court
stated that “we determine that Utah’s no-fault statute ‘should not be
discarded because some members of the class have rights, which may
be adversely affected.’”70 The court reasoned that “an individual’s. . .interests ‘may, in some cases, have to yield to the power of
the Legislature to promote the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.’”71
Thus, the Warren court not only recognized the legislature’s
power to limit statutorily created rights but also indicated that the
legislature has the ability to substitute a right that existed for all individuals at common law with a statutory right applicable to a limited
class of individuals. If it is appropriate for the courts to allow the legislature to limit a common law right to a limited number of individuals as Warren states, then the courts should also defer to the legislature when it creates a limited right that did not exist at common law
or under the Constitution. The legislature, therefore, acted well
within its authority when it limited the UADA’s remedies. The Burton court correctly applied the law as stated.
(2) Deference to legislative intent. Utah courts have consistently acknowledged that the legislature—and not the courts—is the
proper body to effectuate changes to statutory law. Statements made

67. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-A-22-309 (1998). This statute limits the recovery of
general damages to those persons whose medical expenses resulting from the accident exceed
$3,000 or whose injuries include death, dismemberment, permanent disability, permanent impairment, or permanent disfigurement. See id.
68. 937 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1997).
69. See id. at 558.
70. Id. at 561 (quoting Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 191
P.2d 612, 624 (Utah 1948)).
71. Id. at 562 (quoting Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 (Utah
1985)).
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by the Utah Supreme Court in Stanton v. Stanton 72 and State Farm
Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Clyde 73 illustrate the court’s recognition of the legislature’s prerogative to balance policies that it deems
important.
In Stanton, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted a state statute
that set the age of majority for males at twenty-one and females at
eighteen for determining support obligations in divorce cases.74
While recognizing that the difference in age might be discriminatory,
the court stated that “[d]ue to the important concept of separation
of powers in our government, the courts should defer to the prerogative of the legislature to make the laws, and confine their own actions to interpreting and applying them.”75 The court added that “in
order to maintain and safeguard the balance of power so essential to
our system of government, we think it is correct and desirable to adhere to a policy of caution and restraint in respect for the action of
the legislature.”76
The Burton majority’s approach to statutory interpretation parallels that of the Stanton court. The majority concluded that “[d]ue
respect for the legislative prerogative in lawmaking requires that the
judiciary not interfere with enactments of the Legislature where disagreement is founded only on policy considerations and the legislative scheme employs reasonable means to effectuate a legitimate
end.”77 Thus, the majority properly limited its work to interpreting
and applying the statute rather than modifying or partially repealing
it. Allowing Burton to bring a tort claim for discharge in violation of
a public policy would have indirectly modified the UADA rather
than simply interpreting or applying it.
Deference to legislative intent is appropriate even when the court
believes the result to be inequitable. As previously discussed, the
Clyde court realized that it could not ignore the statute’s plain language even if it caused an inequitable result.78 This conclusion is
equally applicable to Burton. While the class of persons protected by
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
2000).
78.

517 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1974), rev’d, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
920 P.2d 1184 (Utah 1996).
See Stanton, 517 P.2d at 1011.
Id. at 1011-12 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1012.
Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469, at *5 (Utah Jan. 19,
See Clyde, 920 P.2d at 1187.

813

TIL-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/20/00 11:17 AM

[2000

the UADA may be unreasonably restricted, this “is an argument for
amendment of the statute, not for [the court’s] ignoring its words.”79
The separation of powers argument in favor of Exam Center
goes even further than illustrated in the above cases. The majority
concluded that “[i]n matters not affecting fundamental rights, the
prerogative of the legislative branch is broad and must by necessity
be so if government is to be by the people through their elected representatives and not by judges.”80
b. Impact on small employers. In making its decision to reject Burton’s appeal, the Burton majority also considered the impact that
recognizing the tort of discharge in violation of public policy would
have on small employers. The majority found that allowing a tort
claim would not only defeat the purposes of the statutory requirement establishing a minimum number of employees, but also would
result in small employers bearing greater costs than would large employers, who are protected by the UADA.81
The majority expressed an additional concern that smaller employers would not have the benefits of the “simplified procedure”
provided by the UADA and would instead be subject to the longer
statute of limitations and the full range of tort liability.82 The UADA,
as previously explained, contains specific provisions detailing the procedure for an aggrieved individual to follow in making an employment discrimination claim.83 First, any claim must be filed within
180 days.84 An investigator is then assigned to negotiate a settlement
between the parties,85 and “[c]onciliation between the parties is to
be urged and facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process.”86
The UADA’s extensive dispute resolution structure embodies the
concept of a resolution process that is faster, less expensive, and focused on compromise settlements.
The majority correctly argued that small employers would be
worse off if subject to a tort claim because they would not receive

79. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1157
(Utah 1989)).
80. Id.
81. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *5-6.
82. See id. at *6.
83. See supra Part II.A.3; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-107 (1998).
84. See § 34A-5-107(1)(c).
85. See § 34A-5-107(3)(a).
86. See § 34A-5-107(10).
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the protection afforded by the UADA’s administrative review process. Even if the costs of actual compliance are simply ignored, the
disadvantages to a small employer in the handling of possible claims
are still readily apparent for several reasons. First, the small employer
would be subject to a longer statute of limitations.87 Second, no investigator would be assigned to attempt settlement or evaluate the
basis of the claim prior to litigation. Third, unlike the UADA, where
the emphasis on conciliation avoids many costs, tort suits against
small employers usually involve the costly (both in time and money)
process of discovery as well as full-length trials. As a result, small employers would be better off under the UADA than they would be
outside of its jurisdiction. Thus, recognizing the tort for discharge in
violation of a public policy would clearly contradict what Congress
envisioned when implementing Title VII and subsequent civil rights
legislation (at least with respect to protecting small employers).
2. The dissent: powerful arguments—just not powerful enough
Justice Durham’s dissent raised powerful policy arguments explaining why the court should recognize Burton’s claim for discharge
in violation of a public policy. She argued that failure to allow Burton’s claim to go forward would essentially give smaller employers
license to discriminate against their employees and frustrate the legislature’s goal of eliminating discrimination and undermine the quality
of life enjoyed by both Utahans and society as a whole.
a. License to discriminate? The dissent’s most compelling policy
argument is that employers could construe the court’s refusal to recognize a tort claim for discharge in violation of a public policy as
tacit approval for small employers to discriminate, based not only on
age, but also on race, sex, religion, and disability.88 Thus, not

87. While an aggrieved individual would be required to file a complaint within 180 days,
an employer not covered by the provisions of the UADA would be subject to the statute of
limitations applicable to torts generally. Under Utah law, that is four years. See UTAH CODE
ANN. 78-12-25 (1998).
88. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *7 (Durham, J., dissenting). In addition, the
amicus brief for the ACLU claimed that refusing to recognize the tort would result in small
employers receiving a license to discriminate. See Brief for Amicus ACLU at 5-10, Burton v.
Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). However, the dissent appeared to miss the mark. Public policy regarding discharge in violation of religion, race,
or sex has been stated in other statutes or in the Utah State Constitution, and thus the tort
would be available in those cases.
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allowing a tort claim would allow employers with fewer than fifteen
employees to discriminate without any serious repercussions. 89
The dissent based its opinion on similar types of cases from other
jurisdictions. One such case was Molesworth v. Brandon,90 in which a
Maryland appellate court examined the issue of whether an employer
should be exempt from claims of sexual discrimination simply because the employer had fewer than the fifteen employees required by
statute.91 The court allowed the tort of discharge in violation of a
public policy because Maryland’s “General Assembly [did not] intend[] to grant small businesses in Maryland a license to discriminate.”92
The Ohio Supreme Court made a similar finding in Collins v.
Rizkana.93 At issue in Collins was an Ohio anti-discrimination statute
(Ohio Revised Code Ann. 4112.01(A)(2)) requiring that an employer
have four or more employees to be subject to the statute.94 The
Collins court overturned a lower court’s grant of summary judgment
to the defendant, ruling that the statute could not be interpreted “as
an intent by the General Assembly to grant small businesses in Ohio
a license to sexually harass/discriminate against their employees with
impunity.”95 Rather, the statute was evidence of “an intention to exempt small businesses from the burdens . . . [of the statute], not
from its anti-discrimination policy.”96 The court concluded that “we
cannot find it to be Ohio’s public policy that an employer with three
employees may condition their employment upon the performance
of sexual favors while an employer with four employees may not.”97
89. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *7 (Durham, J., dissenting). This argument ignores
any consequences a small employer would face resulting from age discrimination such as the
loss of key employees, lower employee morale, and a poor business reputation. The statement
is meant to address only the legal consequences of such actions.
90. 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996).
91. See id. at 609-10.
92. Id. at 615. The court held that Maryland’s policy “against sex discrimination is
ubiquitous.” Id. at 613. In addition, the court pointed to “at least thirty-four statutes, one
executive order, and one constitutional amendment in Maryland that prohibits discrimination
based on sex in certain circumstances.” Id. Utah, on the other hand, has been virtually silent as
to discrimination based on age.
93. 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995).
94. See id. at 655.
95. Id at 660-61.
96. Id. at 661.
97. Id. The Collins court was able to point to other statutory provisions forbidding sexual discrimination as well as a general public policy statement in one of the statutes forbidding
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The power of the dissent’s argument is thus evidenced by two
other states’ courts that openly rejected the notion of permitting
small employers to discriminate while holding to a higher standard
those employers who employed at least the statutory minimum. Both
courts allowed a tort claim for discharge in violation of a public policy to go forward.98 The courts correctly concluded that efforts to
eliminate employment discrimination should not be limited on the
basis of the size of the employer. Discrimination should be either
tolerated or eliminated. In any case, the solution to discrimination
should not be a scheme that essentially grants “qualified immunity”
to employers of certain size.
In support of the dissent, a decision by the Utah Supreme Court
recognizing a wrongful discharge in Burton would have sent a strong
message to Utah citizens and surrounding states that age discrimination will not be tolerated. Also, the court would have bolstered the
idea that any effort to purge society of discrimination is doomed to
fail unless society consistently conveys that discrimination will not be
tolerated in any form.
b. Other policy arguments. The dissent also pointed to two other
policy reasons why the lower court’s ruling should be overturned.
First, the dissent argued that a significant majority (69.7%) of Utah
employers employ less than fifteen employees, the UADA’s statutory
minimum number. Thus, failure to allow a tort of discharge in violation of a public policy would frustrate the broad goal of the legislature to eliminate discrimination.99 Second, the dissent contended
that “the way in which a state regulates relations between employees

the practices of sexual discrimination. See id. at 658. Once again, other statutes and a public
policy statement forbidding age discrimination cannot be found under Utah law.
98. Two other states addressed the issue of age discrimination. The Supreme Court of
Washington allowed the tort claim to go forward on the strength of a statute separate from
Washington’s equivalent of the UADA, which stated a public policy and implied a remedy. See
Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258, 1262-66 (Wash. 1990). However, the court did not “reach
plaintiffs’ claim that the statutory scheme treats employees of small firms in such a way as to
offend the state constitution’s privileges and immunities clause.” Id. at 1260. Conversely, the
Supreme Court of California openly rejected recognizing a tort for discharge in violation of a
public policy because the employer did not employ at least five employees. See Jennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074, 1079-81 (Cal. 1994). The court held that “while the Legislature has
made a broad statement of policy, it has not extended that policy to small employers.” Id. at
1079.
99. See Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469, at *9 (Utah Jan.
19, 2000).
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and employers has a significant impact on the quality of life for many
of its citizens and ultimately for the society as a whole.”100
The power of the dissent’s arguments is evident in the percentages alone. Nearly seventy percent of Utah employers employ less
than fifteen employees.101 Thus, the dissent intimates that seventy
percent of Utah employers have now been given a license to engage
in age-based discrimination. As the dissent succinctly stated, the majority’s decision creates “an enormous loophole which Utah employers may exploit to the detriment of many Utah employees.”102
c. The forgotten public policy argument. The dissent omitted a potentially significant policy argument stemming from general tort law.
A common tort principle states that when in doubt, in cases of intentional injury, the burden of the injury should lie with the party causing the harm.103 Furthermore, a court should not determine whether
a cause of action exists based on the status of the victim (or worse
yet, the status of the tortfeasor) instead of the wrong suffered.
Together, these arguments support the dissent’s conclusion that
the Burton court should have acknowledged the tort of discharge in
violation of a public policy. In an employment context, it seems only
fair that a defendant should bear the burden of paying damages if his
or her actions resulted in the unfair discharge of the plaintiff. This
question of fairness directly affects Burton, who is left without a
remedy because his tort claim cannot go forward.104 Moreover, the
dissent could have argued that the intent of the UADA was not to
guarantee an employee access to recovery if that employee happened
to be the fifteenth employee but deny access if an employee happened to be the fourteenth employee.
3. Public policy and other considerations favoring the majority
In many ways, neither party deserved to lose the public policy
side of this case. Each party pointed to compelling reasons why the
Utah Supreme Court should rule in its favor. Burton thus begs the

100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at *7.
103. See, e.g., PROSSER ET AL., TORTS-CASES AND MATERIALS, 17-88 (9th ed. 1994).
104. Appellant urged that the Utah State Constitution requires a remedy under its open
courts provisions. See Brief for Appellant at 11, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040,
2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000).
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question: which should the courts favor, the rights of the individual
or the collective legislative majority?
Despite the fact that both the majority and the dissent advanced
solid public policy reasons for their respective decisions, there are
three reasons why the majority’s public policy arguments are ultimately more compelling. First, the balance of powers doctrine requires the legislature to legislate and the courts to interpret and enforce the law. Second, by effectively overruling the provisions of the
UADA, the court would jeopardize all other Title VII statutory
schemes. Third, there are compelling reasons besides the UADA that
will encourage employers not to discriminate.
a. Legislatures should legislate and courts should enforce. While
there is a valid argument to be made that the courts should resolve
inequities created by the legislature, Burton is not a case for the
court to do so. Legislatures are naturally better equipped to handle
the extensive research and analysis that the legislative process requires. Furthermore, legislatures are often called upon to balance
competing public policy interests. Overruling the statutory scheme in
an effort to eradicate age discrimination would ignore other important issues considered in the development of the UADA. While the
legislature is concerned with eliminating discrimination of all types, it
has other concerns as well. The viability of small businesses is also
important. Though age discrimination may cost some employees
their jobs, the failure of small businesses would cause the loss of jobs
as well.
A powerful argument can be made that refusal to allow the tort
of discharge in violation of a public policy will promote inequity
based on the status of the employee. While true, this argument also
misses the mark. The current statute expressly provides for this type
of inequity. Employees must reach the age of forty before protection
becomes effective. Should the court refuse to overturn this age limitation, is it licensing the ability to discriminate against individuals
that are under the age of forty?
Furthermore, discrimination in favor of older employees is perfectly legal under the statute as it now stands. Simply put, for a variety of reasons, the line has to be drawn somewhere. When the conflict takes place close to the line, the inequities always seem more
apparent. Nevertheless, it is the role of the legislature to draw that
line, and the court must respect that line despite its beliefs about
possible inequities.
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b. The domino effect. Title VII and its subsequent legislation limit
their coverage based on the number of employees. By recognizing
the tort of discharge in violation of a public policy, especially in the
absence of a clear statement of that policy, all legislative employment
schemes that incorporate some sort of minimum employee requirement become suspect.
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) serves as an appropriate example.105 The FMLA applies only to employers with at least
fifty employees.106 It contains an important benefit, if not right, allowing individuals to take time away from work to care for a sick
loved one without fear of losing their employment.107 Congress,
however, expressly limited this right to those persons who work for
employers with fifty or more employees. A possible explanation for
this is that, as with Title VII and the ADEA, Congress was attempting to weigh competing policy concerns.
Likewise, by allowing a claim for tortious discharge in violation
of a public policy, the court would effectively overturn the UADA’s
minimum employee requirement, which would place at risk similar
schemes that protect against sex and age discrimination, guarantee
family medical leave, and provide other similar statutory benefits.
Simply put, nullifying the minimum employee requirement would
ignore the public policy reasons that Congress considered in
developing the requirement. While it may be argued that changes are
needed in these areas, it would be wiser to note that need and allow
the legislature, in its proper role, to evaluate competing public policies and then balance the policies accordingly.
c. Other deterrents outside of the legal process that encourage
employers not to discriminate. The dissent’s public policy arguments
ignore that there are several reasons outside the legal arena that discourage employers from discriminating on the basis of age. For example, an employer who consistently discriminates based on age or
any other criteria will suffer greater turnover of employees. In addition, employee morale suffers in a work place where discrimination is
tolerated. Finally, the reputation of a business will be stained if it becomes recognized as a discriminating employer.

105. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).
106. See § 2611(4)(a)(I).
107. See generally § 2612 (outlining various levels of leave benefits).
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d. Conclusion. To state that the majority has the better end of the
public policy debate is not to discount the dissent’s arguments altogether. Clearly, the court should send messages that discourage
rather than encourage discrimination. Furthermore, when in doubt,
courts should hold a tortfeasor liable for the damages caused by his
or her inappropriate behavior. However, the juggling of competing
public policies is best performed by a body responsible to the members of society it purports to represent—the legislature. The majority
therefore correctly concluded that “the prerogative of the legislative
branch is broad and must by necessity be so if government is to be by the
people through their elected representatives and not by judges.”108
B. Stumbling at the Finish Line: What the Majority Should Have Done
Differently
The majority did a good job of pointing to countervailing public
policy reasons that are sufficient to justify the majority’s decision to
not recognize the tort of discharge in violation of a public policy.
However, the court never truly analyzed Burton’s claim in the context in which it was brought. A simple application of the Ryan test109
to Burton’s claim would have led the majority to the inescapable
conclusion that Burton’s claim simply fails to meet the requirements
of a claim for discharge in violation of a public policy as set forth under Utah law.110 Instead, the majority, in a cursory manner, merely
dismissed Burton’s attempt to establish a public policy against age
discrimination.111
1. Burton’s claim under the Ryan analysis
As previously mentioned, the four prongs of the Ryan test for
tortious discharge in violation of public policy require the plaintiff to
show: (1) the discharge of the employee by the employer; (2) the existence of a clear and substantial public policy; (3) the fact that the
employee’s conduct brought the policy into play; and (4) there exists

108. Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469, at *5 (Utah Jan. 19,
2000) (emphasis added).
109. See supra Part II.B.2.
110. In fairness to the majority, it is unclear whether either party or any of the amicus
briefs filed pursued a thorough Ryan analysis either.
111. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *4-5. Not only is the court’s analysis cursory, but it
is also incomplete, addressing only one of the four prongs of the Ryan test. See id.
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a causal connection between the discharge and the conduct that
brought the public policy into play.112 A close analysis of Burton’s
claim under this test reveals that his claim simply falls short of meeting the requirements of the tort.
a. Discharge. The facts of Burton easily satisfy the first prong of
the Ryan test. All that is required is a showing that the employee has
been discharged.113 Although the parties disagreed about the reasons
underlying Burton’s termination, neither disputed the fact that Burton was discharged.114
b. Public policy. The second prong of the test—that a clear and
substantial public policy exists115—was the element of the Ryan test
most contested by the parties.116 The standard in Ryan indicates that
“[a] public policy is ‘clear’ only if plainly defined by legislative enactments, constitutional standards, or judicial decisions.”117
(1) The absence of public policy statements in Utah legislative
enactments, constitutional standards, and judicial decisions. Legislative enactments concerning employment discrimination in Utah are
few and far between. Indeed, Burton and amici ACLU and AFLCIO located only two Utah laws that address age discrimination in

112. See Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998).
113. See id.
114. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL
38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). (claiming that Burton was discharged because of age); Brief for
Appellee at 5, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19,
2000) (arguing that Burton’s discharge was the result of his services no longer being required).
115. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404.
116. The issue of a clear and substantial policy was argued in all briefs submitted to the
court. Appellant’s argument regarding this issue covered nearly four full pages. See Brief for
Appellant at 7-10, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan.
19, 2000). Likewise, Appellee’s discussion of the issue took up more than five pages. See Brief
for Appellee at 8-13, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan.
19, 2000). Amicus Utah Manufacturer’s Association dedicated four pages of its brief to the
issue, see Brief for Amicus Utah Manufacturers Burton v. Exam Center Indus., at 7-11, No.
980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000), while amicus AFL-CIO dedicated four pages,
see Brief for Amicus ALF-CIO at 5-8, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL
38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000), and amicus ACLU dedicated two pages (followed by eight pages
arguing that the UADA underscores the existing clear and substantial public policy), see Brief
for Amicus ACLU at 3-10, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469
(Utah Jan. 19, 2000).
117. Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405.
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the employment context: the UADA118 and a now-repealed statute
that applied only to the State as an employer.119
(a) Public policy in the UADA. The UADA, as a clear
statement of a public policy, is limited to what it says on its face.120
The relevant portion of the statute states that “[i]t is a discriminatory
or prohibited employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire,
or promote, or to discharge . . . any person . . . because of . . . age, if
the individual is 40 years of age or older.”121 However, the UADA
defines an “employer” as a person “employing 15 or more employees.”122 Thus, the UADA does not apply to employers of fewer than
fifteen employees. As the majority concluded, “[the Utah] legislature
has made a . . . decision to prohibit age discrimination in the termination of employees only by large employers.”123
Furthermore, the UADA is devoid of any general statement of
public policy. In other words, the Act details actions that constitute
discrimination, defines various terms, and outlines the complaint
procedure to follow but never states the public policy reasons underlying the legislature’s implementation of the Act.
In contrast, in Molesworth v. Brandon, the Maryland Court of
Appeals had a public policy statement to which it could point.124 The
court used this public policy and considered the plaintiff’s claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy even though the
plaintiff’s employer had fewer than fifteen employees, as required
under Maryland’s Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA).125 While
sustaining the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of a
public policy, the court referred to the public policy statement in
FEPA for support.126 That statement declared that
[i]t is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Maryland, in the
exercise of its police power for the protection of the public safety,
public health and general welfare, for the maintenance of business

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
2000).
124.
125.
126.

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-102 (1998).
See § 67-10-2(4) (repealed 1995).
See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405.
§ 34A-5-106(1)(a)(i).
§ 34A-5-102(8).
Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469, at *4 (Utah Jan. 19,
672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996).
See id. at 611-12; see also MD. CODE ANN. § 14 (1957).
See Molesworth, 672 A.2d at 611-12.
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and good government and for the promotion of the State’s trade,
commerce and manufacturers to assure all persons equal opportunity
in receiving employment and in all labor management-union relations regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin,
sex, age, marital status, or physical or mental handicap unrelated in
nature and extent so as to reasonably preclude the performance of
the employment, and to that end to prohibit discrimination in employment by any person, group, labor organization, organization or
any employer or his agents.127

The Burton dissent’s reliance on Molesworth is unfounded.128 The
UADA is devoid of any kind of public policy statement similar to the
one contained in the Maryland statute. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the UADA contains a clear statement of public policy against
employment discrimination regardless of the size of the employer.
(b) Public policy and the state as employer. Amicus ACLU
argued that a clear statement of public policy could be found in a
state law, since repealed but applicable at the time of the suit, that
prohibited employment discrimination by the State in its employment practices.129 The majority correctly dismissed this argument,
despite the fact that it did so with little analysis,130 noting only that
“[w]hile arguably a public policy can be found in that statute[,] . . .
it obviously has no application to a private employer.”131
Amicus ACLU’s argument is fatally flawed for three reasons.
First, it overlooks the fact that the statute has been repealed and that
a case should be both determined upon those laws in force at the
time of decision and based on the relevant public policy at the time
of decision.132 Second, the law’s statement of public policy reflects
the legislature’s intent with respect to how the State should handle
its employment matters.133 Finally, the replacement state regulation

127. Id.
128. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *9 (Durham, J., dissenting).
129. See Brief for Amicus ACLU at 3, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000
WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-2(4) (repealed 1995)).
130. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *5.
131. Id. at *4.
132. See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (holding generally that a
court’s decision is to be based on law at the time of actual decision rather than at time the suit
was filed).
133. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-2(4) (1998).
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lacks a public policy statement;134 thus, any clear public policy that
may have existed no longer does.
The lack of a legislative enactment that plainly defines Utah’s
public policy against discrimination is compounded by an absence of
such a policy in the Utah State Constitution as well as state jurisprudence. With respect to Utah jurisprudence, the Burton case appears
to be one of first impression, meaning that there is not a judicial
public policy statement on which Burton could rely. While Burton
could argue that there always has to be a first case, it does not necessarily follow that Burton’s claim is a good candidate. The plaintiff’s
inability to point to a legislative enactment, constitutional provision,
or judicial decision was fatal to his claim.
(2) The absence of substantial public interests. In addition to
the existence of a “clear policy,” it is necessary that the policy “further substantial public, as opposed to private, interests.”135 Burton’s
claim apparently would qualify because preventing his discharge
would advance the public interest against age-based employment discrimination. His claim fails, however, because the requirement that
the policy further substantial public interests is additional to the requirement of the existence of a clear policy. Unfortunately for Burton, that clear policy does not exist and cannot be replaced by a favorable decision that advances the public interest against age
discrimination. Burton’s claim thus fails the second prong of the
Ryan test.
c. Employee conduct. Had Burton carefully framed his argument,
he possibly could have satisfied the third prong of the Ryan test,
which directs that the employee’s conduct must bring the public policy into play.136 In order to meet the third prong, however, Burton
must first prove the existence of a clear public policy. Though no
such policy exists (for reasons explained above), this Note assumes,
for purposes of further inquiry, that the second prong of the Ryan
test was met.
In Peterson v. Browning,137 the Utah Supreme Court listed three
actions that typically fall within the public policy exception relating
to the termination of employment: “(1) refusing to commit an illegal

134.
135.
136.
137.

See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R606-3-2 (1997).
Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 405 (Utah 1998).
See id. at 404.
832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992).
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or wrongful act, (2) performing a public obligation, or (3) exercising
a legal right or privilege.”138 Burton’s discharge by Exam Center
clearly falls outside the three examples given by the Utah Supreme
Court.
Ryan, however, offers Burton another possibility. The Ryan
court stated in a footnote that an alternative way of characterizing
the third prong was to determine whether discharging employees in
circumstances similar to the plaintiff’s would place the public policy
in jeopardy.139 Thus, Burton could have argued that discharging individuals on the basis of age would jeopardize the public policy
against age discrimination.140 However, this argument ignores the
countervailing public policy arguments supporting the limitation of
the UADA’s applicability, namely, protecting small employers from
the cost of compliance and avoiding governmental intervention into
intimate business relationships. Once again, the existence of a public
policy (prong two of the Ryan analysis) would have to be established
before the court could take this additional step, assuming that the
court was willing to analyze Burton’s claim based on the Ryan footnote.
d. Causal connection. Ryan’s final requirement mandates that
there be a causal connection between the discharge and the conduct
bringing the policy into play.141 As indicated previously, causation
was disputed by the parties: Burton claimed that his termination was
due to his age, but Exam Center argued that the discharge resulted
from a lack of need for Burton’s services.142 To prevail on this point,
Burton would need to prove that the discharge truly resulted from
his age. However, as the case was before the court on the

138. Id. at 1281 (quoting Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 166-67).
139. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404 n.4.
140. Interestingly, amicus Utah Manufacturers Association argued that a claim for discharge in violation of public policy requires that the discharge be based on employee conduct
and not status. See Brief for Amicus Utah Manufacturers at 19, Burton v. Exam Center Indus.,
at 22-23 No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). In Burton, the plaintiff allegedly was not discharged based on his conduct but because he was too old (status). See supra
Part III.A. While this argument’s logic is sound and appears to be based on the “typical” discharges in violation of public policy set forth in various cases, footnote four in Ryan would
give the court an opportunity to extend the tort of discharge in violation of a public policy beyond cases involving strictly employee conduct. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404 n.4.
141. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404.
142. See supra note 114.
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defendant’s motion to dismiss, any analysis of the “merits” of the
case in this Note would be premature.
The fourth requirement repeats the third prong’s conduct language—that the employee’s conduct must bring the public policy
into play. As a result, the alternative in footnote four of Ryan—
determining whether discharging circumstances similar to the plaintiff’s would jeopardize the public policy—could be extended to cover
the fourth prong as well. Thus, the need for employee conduct
would be obviated.
e. Conclusion: falling short of the Ryan requirements. While Burton arguably met the first prong and plausibly could satisfy the third
and fourth prongs of the Ryan test, his claim failed to satisfy the requirements of the second prong—the existence of a clear public policy. The court has consistently made statements as to the narrowness
with which public policy should be construed.143 In any case, Burton
failed to demonstrate a clear public policy as defined by legislative
enactment, constitutional provision, or judicial decision.
Burton’s failure to demonstrate the existence of a public policy is
singularly fatal to his claim and obviated the need for the court to
engage in further analysis. However, such a decision could have been
made after oral arguments without requesting amicus briefs, and,
therefore, was not likely considered by the majority. Since the public
policy arguments on both sides are strong, the court’s decision was
reduced to arguments based on public policy rather than a strict interpretation of the Ryan test. Thus, one is left with the sense that the
court’s decision was a response to the emotion of public policy rather
than a thorough legal analysis. By failing to thoroughly analyze Burton’s claim on a legal basis, the court made the decision appear much
closer and more difficult than it actually was.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision facing the Utah Supreme Court in Burton v. Exam
Center Industrial should not have been as difficult as the court
143.See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405 (recognizing the importance of keeping the scope of the
public policy exception narrow to avoid unreasonably eliminating employer discretion in discharging employees); see also Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992) (indicating that narrow construction of public policies upon which wrongful terminations may be
based is appropriate to avoid eliminating employer discretion in discharging at-will employees);
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989) (explaining that courts
must be careful to avoid the overextension of public policy).
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made it. The court correctly upheld the statutory scheme set up by
the Utah legislature under the UADA, even though it meant that
some individuals (like Burton) suffered real harms that will go without remedy. In so doing, the majority correctly decided that rather
than effecting change through judicial “legislation,” any proposed
change in the balancing of public priorities ought to take place in the
legislature. However, the majority’s failure to apply the Ryan test in
its entirety creates the impression that the case was decided on public
policy alone. While public policy arguments are particularly crucial to
the debate in the present case, the majority failed to sufficiently establish one key fact: Burton’s claim simply does not meet the requirements for the tort of discharge in violation of a public policy.
While most would agree that the fight against discrimination has
made progress, few would argue that the success has been complete
or that all residue of discrimination no longer exists in our society.
The defeat of discrimination in all of its forms will not occur until all
of us, on an individual basis, truly accept that discrimination in any
form is improper. Until society as a whole comes to that realization,
it is wiser to allow the will of the majority, as expressed by its elected
representatives, to make tough policy decisions, even when a few individuals are left without a remedy. Expanding the scope of the tort
of discharge in violation of a public policy in general, and the definition of public policy in particular, is not the answer; neither is legislating from the bench—even when the cause appears to be just.
Evan S. Tilton ∗

∗ The author would like to thank Kevin Worthen for his insight and helpful comments
on drafts of this Note. This note is dedicated to Kimberli and Tyler—thanks for the dream.
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